Exploring Smartphone-based Side-channel Attacks Against 3D Printers
任奎   Kui Ren
报告人照片   任奎现为美国纽约州立大学布法罗分校计算机科学与工程系教授,泛在安全与隐私实验室主任。他主要从事云安全、无线通信系统安全等领域的研究工作。目前他已经发表170多篇论文,其中多篇有影响力的论文发表在IEEE/ACM汇刊等顶级期刊和ACM CCS、ACM MM、IEEE ICNP、IEEE ICDCS和IEEE INFOCOM等重要国际学术会议上。他获得过包括IEEE ICNP’11在内的多篇最佳会议论文奖。根据Google Scholar的统计,他的H-Index指数是50, 文章总引用次数超过15,000次。他现/曾任IEEE TDSC、IEEE TIFS、电子学报 (英文版)和网络与信息安全学报的编委。他获得了2015年美国纽约州立大学布法罗分校工程与应用科学学院年度资深学者奖、2016年美国纽约州立大学布法罗分校杰出学者奖, 并在2015年当选IEEE Fellow (会士)。
  Additive manufacturing, also known as 3D printing, has been increasingly applied to fabricate highly intellectual-property (IP) sensitive products. However, the related IP protection issues in 3D printers are still largely underexplored. On the other hand, smartphones are equipped with rich onboard sensors and have been applied to pervasive mobile surveillance in many applications. These facts raise one critical question: is it possible that smartphones access the side-channel signals of 3D printer and then hack the IP information? In this talk, we answer this by performing an end-to-end study on exploring smartphone-based side-channel attacks against 3D printers. Specifically, we formulate the problem of the IP side-channel attack in 3D printing. Then, we investigate the possible acoustic and magnetic side-channel attacks using the smartphone built-in sensors. Moreover, we explore a magnetic-enhanced side-channel attack model to accurately deduce the vital directional operations of 3D printer. Experimental results show that by exploiting the side-channel signals collected by smartphones, we can successfully reconstruct the physical prints and their G-code with Mean Tendency Error of 5.87% on regular designs and 9.67% on complex designs, respectively. Our study demonstrates this new and practical smartphone-based side channel attack on compromising IP information during 3D printing.
报告时间:2016年12月09日14时30分    报告地点:西区科技实验楼西楼1810
报名截止日期:2016年12月09日    可选人数:80